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SUMMARY 
Two of  the  Lockheed L-1011 automatic f l i g h t  control  systems - yaw s t a -  
b i l i t y  augmentation and automatic landing - a re  described i n  terms of t h e i r  
redundancies. The r e l i a b i l i t y  object ives  for these systems a re  discussed 
and r e l a t ed  t o  in-service experience. I n  general, t he  a v a i l a b i l i t y  of t h e  
s t a b i l i t y  augmentation system i s  higher than the  o r ig ina l  design require- 
ment, but  i s  commensurate wi th  ea r ly  estimates. The in-service experience 
with automatic landing i s  not su f f i c i en t  t o  provide ve r i f i ca t ion  of  Cate- 
gory I11 automatic landing system estimated ava i l ab i l i t y .  Component r e l i -  
a b i l i t y  i s ,  however, generally tracking expectation. 
INTRODUCTION 
The L-1011 TriStar has been i n  a i r l i n e  operation since Apr i l1972 a s  
one of the  current generation of wide-bow jets. I n  service a t  present ,  
there  a re  about 80 u n i t s  of  the current model which i s  a short  t o  medium 
range airplane t h a t  cruises  typ ica l ly  a t  M =.85, Hp = 33,000 fee t .  
takeoff and landing, weights a re  430,000 and 360,000 pounds. 
2 show the  airplane dimensions and f l i g h t  control  surfaces, respectively.  
Maximum 
Figures 1 and 
The Avionic Fl ight  Control System (AFCS) of  the L-1011 i s  highly redun- 
dant i n  comparison t o  such systems of the  previous generation of  a i r c r a f t .  
This redundancy t o  a ce r t a in  extent i s  manifest i n  the so-called "cruise" 
autopi lot  portions of  the AFCS, but t h i s  was more or l e s s  a f a l l o u t  of t he  
need f o r  high redundancy i n  the  Category I11 Automatic Landing System (ALS). 
The configuration of the  "cruise" port ion o f  t he  AFCS yaw control  channel 
was a l so  a f fec ted  by t h i s  Category I11 requirement. 
It i s  intended i n  the  following discussion t o  provide b r i e f  descrip- 
t ions  of the  automatic yaw cruise control  system and of the automatic 
landing system, these descr ipt ions t o  provide t h e  background for judging 
system redundancy i n  comparison t o  other  systems famil iar  t o  the  reader. 
It i s  fu r the r  intended t o  present in-service derived data describing the  
r e l i a b i l i t y  of  these two systems and t o  r e l a t e  t h i s  experience t o  expec- 
ta t ion .  
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AFCS OVERVIEW 
The complete AFCS including Category I I I a  automatic landing was c e r t i f i -  
cated a t  the t i m e  of i n i t i a l  airplane FAA ce r t i f i ca t ion  i n  April1972. 
has been subsequently so c e r t i f i e d  by Canada (MOT), Great Br i ta in  (CAA), 
Japan (JCAB),  and West Germany (LEiA). I n  the t o t a l  f l e e t  t o  date,  there  
have been about 160,000 revenue f l i g h t  hours accumulated f o r  approximately 
80 , 000 f l i g h t s  . 
It 
Briefly the AFCS consists of four subsystems : 
Stab i l i t y  Augmentation System (SAS) 
Autopilot/Flight Director System (APFDS) 
Speed Control System (SCS) 
Flight Control Electronic System (FCES) 
The components which comprise the AFCS are  l i s t e d  by subsystem i n  
Table 1. For t o t a l  systems function, these components interface with other 
airplane elements such as sensors-air data, a t t i t ude  references, radio 
navigation and al t imetry systems, electrohydraulic and e l e c t r i c a l  f l i g h t  
control servos, f l i g h t  instruments, control panels, e t c .  
The SAS functions include yaw damping, tu rn  coordination, runway align- 
ment during automatic landing and automatic s teer ing during the landing 
ro l lou t .  
The APFDS provides fo r  automatic control of the airplane from takeoff 
t o  landing. There a re  the usual modes of 
Roll and Pitch Atti tude Hold with Control Wheel 
Alti tude Select and Hold 
'Vertical Speed Select and Hold 
Airspeed Hold on Pitch 
Mach Hold on Pitch 
Heading Select and Hold 
VOR and Area Navigation 
Localizer Capture and Track 
Steering (01s)  and Turbulence Configuration Control 
I n  addition, there  a re  the common axis  modes of 
Appro a ch 
Approach/Land (Autoland) 
Go -Around 
Takeoff 
The p i tch  comands f o r  %-Around and Takeoff a re  derived i n  the SCS with 
Takeoff being a f l i g h t  director  mode only. 
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The SCS auto thro t t le  modes are:  
Airspeed Select and Hold 
S t a l l  Margin Control 
The la t ter l  i s  primarily an approach/land mode which uses angle of a t tack  a s  
the  basic  reference. 
&-Around and Takeoff modes using angle of a t tack  a s  a reference. 
And a s  just mentioned, the SCS a lso  provides fo r  t he  
The FCES provides a m.mber of functions such a s  e l e c t r i c a l  p i tch  trim, 
Mach trim, Mach f ee l ,  s t a l l  warning, a l t i t ude  a l e r t ,  primary f l i g h t  controls 
monitoring, automatic ground speed brakes and d i r ec t  lift control. A l l  of  
these functions operate when e i the r  p i l o t  o r  autopi lot  i s  i n  control. 
With these descriptive remarks as  background, fur ther  discussion i s  
confined t o  the SAS 
System. 
requirements which we s h a l l  examine and r e l a t e  t o  the r e l i a b i l i t i e s  achieved 
i n  service use. 
c-uise control system and to the  Automatic Landing 
Each of these systems has operational availability/reliability 
STABILITY AUGMENTATION SYSTEM (SAS) 
System Mechanization 
Figure 3 depicts the cruise configuration of  the SAX. Each of the two 
yaw computers contains two computation channels t h a t  output ident ica l  servo 
commands t o  an in- l ine monitored electrohydraulic servo. Four a i leron 
posi t ion transducers and three r a t e  gyros service the four computation 
channels of the t o t a l  system. 
inputs and the a i le ron  transducers provide for  tu rn  coordination. 
The r a t e  gyros provide f o r  Dutch r o l l  damping 
Figure 4 shows one channel of the SAS cruise computation. It i s  seen 
The 
tha t  the gains a re  scheduled w i t h  f l ap  posit ion and the gyro path has the 
usual low frequency washout f i l t e r  plus a high frequency cut-off.  
a i leron input path has a l imited washout to remove a i le ron  t r i m  e f fec ts  
and i n  addition an adjustable dead zoae such t h a t  tu rn  coordination only 
comes in to  play fo r  su f f i c i en t ly  large ai leron inputs.  
i s  subject t o  gain changing to match the gyro channel and t o  low pass 
f i l t e r ing .  
by a two Hz second order servo fo r  small amplitudes. However, the primary 
control surface servo i s  severely hinge moment l imited i n  cruise f l i g h t .  
The passed s ignal  
The voter output to rudder surface response can be approximated 
It i s  noted t h a t  i n  Figure 4 the output of the computation comprises 
one input t o  a voter. 
computation channels of  t h i s  dual-dual mechanization. 
there  a re  two computations and two voters per yaw computer w i t h  two voter 
outputs required to drive one SAS electrohydraulic servo a s  depicted i n  
The other inputs a re  derived from the other three 
A s  one would expect, 
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Figure 5 .  The two voter outputs provide f o r  driving the EHV coi l s  i n  a 
push-pull arrangement with two s e t s  of dual monitors acting t o  shut off  
the  servo loop hydraulics i f  a f au l t  i s  detected. 
There a r e  a l so  monitors i n  f ront  of the voters which control the 
signal configuration of the voter inputs as  shown i n  Figure 6. 
i l l u s t r a t e s  the concept whereby the monitors control switching logic  tha t  
subst i tutes  signal ground o r  an al ternate  computation fo r  a faul ted channel. 
Figure 7 shows the  voter input crossfeeding fo r  the complete dual-dual 
system. 
This figure 
I n  addition t o  servo and computation monitors, there are  ra te  gyro 
monitors and e l e c t r i c a l  power monitors. 
engage logic  while the former monitors operate into the voter switching 
The l a t t e r  operate in to  the servo 
logic.  
Design Objectives and Performance 
The function of the cruise mode of $he SAS i s ,  of course, t o  provide 
improved Dutch roll damping fo r  enhancement of passenger comfort and 
handling qual i t ies  and for  reduction of f i n  loads. This reduction of 
ve r t i ca l  t a i l  loading, i n  continuous turbulence, due t o  the action of the 
SAS was ref lected i n  the def ini t ion of l i m i t  design loads. 
Early i n  the development of the L-1011, the effectiveness of the SAS 
was investigated t o  determine performance and r e l i a b i l i t y  objectives for 
the  SAS from a loads viewpoint. It appeared tha t  a minimum damping r a t i o  
of 0.3 and a timewise ava i lab i l i ty  of 97% were modest design objectives 
tha t  would yield s ignif icant  load reductions. It was subsequently found, 
however, tha t  higher damping ra t ios  could be achieved over most of the 
climb, cruise and descent f l i g h t  regimes a s  seen from the data given i n  
Table 2. 
a r e  the damping r a t io s  l e s s  than 0.3. 
Only a t  low meeds. where e f fec ts  on f i n  loads are not c r i t i c a l ,  
It also became evident t ha t  a 97% avai lab i l i ty  requirement was a very 
conservative estimate of system re l i ab i l i t y .  
f a i lu re  ra tes ,  the single channel fa i lure  ra te  was calculated t o  be about 
lom3 per hour and t o  preclude the poss ib i l i ty  that  an airplane might be 
flown without SAS fo r  a protracted period, it i s  required tha t  a t  l ea s t  
one of the two channels be operative for  dispatch. Recognizing tha t  for 
most f l i gh t s  both channels of SAS are  operative, even 99.9% timewise 
ava i lab i l i ty  would appear t o  be conservative. 
On the basis of guaranteed 
A complete discussion of the e f fec t  of SAS avai lab i l i ty  on loads i s  
This figure i l l u s -  given i n  reference (1) from which Figure 8 i s  taken. 
t r a t e s  the def ini t ion of design loading for  ve r t i ca l  t a i l  shear with 0, 97% 
and 100% SAS ava i l ab i l i t i e s .  It i s  based on a mission analysis c r i te r ion  
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whereby the frequency of exceedance of a load quantity i s  calculated for  
operations over specified design f l i g h t  profiles.  
ment as s t a t i s t i c a l l y  described f o r  each segment of a prof i le  i s  applied 
t o  the airplane/load t ransfer  function t o  derive exceedance curves (with 
o r  without SAS operating) fo r  each segment. The segment exceedances are 
summed over the t o t a l  of a l l  p rof i les  t o  determine a load vs. frequency- 
of-exceedance curve for  the mission. 
H 
F 
The turbulence environ- 
It can be seen from Figure 8 tha t  the major reduction (- = 0.70) i s  
realized by having a t  l e a s t  97% avai lab i l i ty  and further reduction comes 
l e s s  readily with 100% ava i l ab i l i t y  real iz ing a r a t i o  of - = 0.65. 
resu l t s  a re  for  a f u l l y  l inear  system and saturation e f fec ts  reduce the 
benefits  somewhat. 
reduction i n  f i n  loading i s  be t te r  than 25% re l a t ive  t o  what it would be 
i f  no SAS were available. 
G 
F These 
I n  summary, however, with 97% avai lab i l i ty  the net 
It would be very surprising i f  the in-service r e l i a b i l i t y  indicated 
a SAS avai lab i l i ty  of l e s s  than 99.9%. The component MIBF values are 
tracking guarantees as indicated i n  Table 3. There have apparently been 
only f ive  complete in- f l igh t  losses of SAS and'a very few delays as  a 
resu l t  of lack of immediate par t s  replacement. These instance's with one 
exception were associated with dispatch fo r  many consecutive f l i gh t s  with 
a fa i led  computation channel. The number given above for  in - f l igh t  losses 
covers a period i n  which revenue f l i gh t  hours were accumulated with an 
average f l i gh t  time of two hours. We believe tha t  there have been no other 
instances of complete loss t o  date, and that  it i s  conservative to use only 
tha t  period fo r  which d e t a i l  records have been evaluated i n  estimating the 
t o t a l  system fa i lure  ra te .  
during the period evaluated, the SAS avai lab i l i ty  would be 
On the basis of actual  t o t a l  in - f l igh t  losses 
(5 losses)  (3 average f l i g h t  time) 
t o t a l  f l i gh t  hours 
1 -  
or  about 99.98%. 
examined and it was found tha t  60 channel fa i lures  were experienced i n  a 
30,000 f l i g h t  hour (2-hour f l i gh t s )  period. 
MTBF of 1000 hours which is  commensurate with the data of Table 3. 
The individual SAS channel in - f l igh t  f a i lu re  ra te  was also 
This indicates a SAS channel 
SAS Conclusions 
With respect t o  the yaw s t a b i l i t y  augmentation system, the following 
conclusions can be drawn: 
o 97% avai lab i l i ty  i s  an extremely conservative value upon 
which t o  base design loads. 
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o With current technology of design, manufacturing and 
a i r l i n e  maintenance, s ingle  channel SAS r e l i a b i l i t y  
should be adequate t o  support f i n  loading design 
c r i t e r i a  a s  established for the  L-1011. 
o L-1011 dual channel SAS provides f i n  load a l l ev ia t ion  
fo r  a l l  p rac t i ca l  purposes equivalent t o  10% SAS avai l -  
a b i l i t y  . 
AUTOMATIC LANDING SYSTEM (ALS) 
System Mechanization 
The pr incipal  elements of t he  ALS are  the APFDS and SAS and t h e i r  
respective sensors i n  the configurations established with the Approach/ 
Land (A/L) mode selected. The system i n  t o t a l  def in i t ion  includes much 
more than these un i t s  but these have, by f a r ,  the most e f f ec t  on system 
r e l i a b i l i t y  and ava i lab i l i ty .  Rel iab i l i ty  i s  used here i n  the sense of 
the system capabi l i ty  t o  complete a landing. It r e l a t e s  d i r ec t ly  t o  
safety,  par t icu lar ly  i n  low weather minima operations. It was, of course, 
the Category I11 requirement t h a t  dictated the extent of redundancy i n  the  
ALS. This redundancy i s  depicted i n  some generali ty i n  Figure 9 for  the 
p i tch  and roll control axes. Each of these axes uses three accelerometers 
(normal or  l a t e r a l )  and three a t t i t ude  inputs. 
only derived p i tch  r a t e ;  roll uses both a t t i t ude  and roll r a t e  signals.  
The Autoland Sensor s ignals  a re  glideslope e r ror  and radio a l t i t ude  f o r  
p i tch  and loca l izer  e r ro r  f o r  roll. 
a re  used but each has dual outputs with high in t eg r i ty  self-monitoring. 
For example, the probabi l i ty  of the two signals from one G/S receiver being 
faul ted a t  a c r i t i c a l  time without warning i s  l e s s  than 10-9. 
Pitch computations use 
Only two each of  the Autoland Sensors 
The same theme of APFDS redundancy i s  carr ied over in to  the SAS i n  
the A/L mode as  seen i n  Figure 10. Here, the exception i s  tha t  only two 
compass systems a re  u t i l i z e d  which do not have the in t eg r i ty  of  an Auto- 
land Sensor. The redundancy requirement, however, i s  not a s  great  fo r  
yaw control as  it i s  f o r  p i tch  and roll. ( I n  the development program, 
automatic landings with no automatic yaw control have been demonstrated 
without any s igni f icant  e f f ec t  except t h a t  the p i l o t  had t o  control the 
ro l lou t . )  
and used t o  define a reference heading e r ro r  which i s  memorized. 
compass signals are  switched out a t  150 f ee t  and integrated r a t e  gyro data 
i s  used from there t o  touchdown. 
control t h i s  function a re  omitted from Figure 10.) During t h i s  time, a 
maneuver i s  performed whereby the a i r c r a f t  fuselage i s  aligned with the 
runway and a wing down i s  held against crosswind. 
The compass inputs a re  ac tua l ly  compared i n  the SAS computers 
The 
(The radio a l t i t ude  signals used t o  
T h i s  use of the compass points out the difference between the safety 
and ava i l ab i l i t y  aspects. For Category I I I a  conditions, the a l ign  
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capabili ty i s  required, a t  present, and i f  one compass system f a i l s  on the 
approach above the a l e r t  height (100 f ee t  for U.S. Carriers),  a missed 
approach i s  executed. 
a b i l i t y  goes the day i s  lo s t .  
Safety implications a re  minimal, but as  f a r  as  avail-  
A s  would be expected, the fail-operative pi tch,  roll and yaw (below 
150 f ee t )  mechanizations closely follow tha t  as  depicted i n  Figures 5, 6, 
and 7 fo r  the cruise yaw control. Four computation channels fo r  each axis  
are  needed for the fail-operative condition and two o r  three fo r  the f a i l -  
passive condition. The l a t t e r  configuration i s  acceptable for Category I1 
operations while the former i s  required down t o  the a l e r t  height for Cate- 
gory I I I a .  There a re  minor differences i n  each servo control and monitoring 
mechanizations, but the basic concepts of Figure 5 are applied. For Cate- 
gory 111, of course, it requires two servos per axis  while one is  acceptable 
for  Category 11. 
Much i s  l e f t  unsaid about other subsystems of the ALS, such a s  
o Speed Control System 
o Automatic Pitch T r i m  
o Direct L i f t  Control 
o AFCS Mode Progress and Warning Indicators 
o Flight Instrument Systems 
o Hydraulic Power Sources 
o Electr ical  Power Sources 
I n  the in te res t  of completeness, however, Table 5 i s  given t o  provide a br ief  
summary of the major elements of the t o t a l  ALS. 
more complete description of the AFCS i s  given i n  Reference 2. 
It i s  also noted that  a 
ALS Objectives and Development Results 
There were three I,-1011 program objectives with respect t o  the ALS. 
1. Achieve a Category I I I a  cer t i f ica t ion  w i t h  a 
system having the potent ia l  for Category I I Ib .  
2. Develop a maintainable system. 
3. Develop a system which has a reasonably high 
ava i lab i l i ty .  
There i s  no doubt we held tenaciously to  achievement of the f irst  objective 
and we l i k e  t o  believe we have done the same with the other two. 
not have always been apparent, but we believe we are  tracking f a i r l y  well 
even though it i s  perhaps too ear ly  t o  have a11 things proven out. 
It may 
It i s  a fac t  t h a t  we ce r t i f i ed  for  Category I I I a  with the  FAA on 
schedule; but, as you are  probably well aware, the manufacturer's c e r t i f i -  
cation i s  only the first of a ser ies .  
capabili ty t o  use the system t o  the sat isfact ion of the same regulatory 
Each operator must v e r i m  i t s  
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agency. 
I n  the meantime, we are  beginning t o  look toward achieving a Category I I I b  
capability. 
One L-1011 operator has accomplished t h i s ;  others are working a t  it. 
z 
One of the things an operator must show t o  achieve an ALS cer t i f ica t ion  
i s  h i s  a b i l i t y  t o  maintain the system. An indication of t h i s  capabili ty i s  
a comparison of f a i lu re  r a t e s  achieved with those used i n  the Lockheed ce r t i -  
f ica t ion  analysis. 
shows a l i s t  of MTBF lower l imi t s  and the i r  currently estimated values. 
data given i n  t h i s  table  are  for  the s ignif icant  contributors t o  the t o t a l  
disconnect probabili ty (below the a l e r t  height). If the M,TBF's of a l l  the 
l i s t e d  uni ts  were a t  the lower limits, the t o t a l  disconnect probabili ty would 
be potent ia l ly  a factor  of two higher, s t i l l  within acceptable limits. These 
"lower l i m i t s ' '  a re  not absolute l i m i t s  i n  view of the f ac t  tha t  the two 
factor  does not put the disconnect probabili ty t o  an unacceptable l eve l  and 
further one low M.TBF value could be compensated by a high one. To a cer ta in  
extent the l i m i t  i s  a tracking l i m i t  t o  signal fo r  more d e t a i l  examination of 
a potent ia l  trouble area. So f a r ,  however, things seem t o  be tracking f a i r l y  
well. 
I n  e f fec t ,  MTBF tracking l i m i t s  a re  defined. Table 4 
The 
With respect t o  ALS avai labi l i ty ,  there i s  very l i t t l e  data t o  display. 
The one a i r l i n e  operator t ha t  has received a Category I I I a  cer t i f ica t ion  has 
shown i n  h i s  i n i t i a l  data gathering period r e su l t s  t o  support the c e r t i f i -  
cation requirement. The reported resu l t s  support the r e l i a b i l i t y  prediction 
but do not allow correlation with the ava i lab i l i ty  estimates of Figure 11. 
This figure gives a prediction of the Category I I I a  ALS ava i lab i l i ty  as an 
operational day (14 hours) progresses. It i s  assumed tha t  10 hours are  
reserved fo r  maintenance and that  the ALS i s  apparently restored t o  a fau l t -  
f ree  condition by the s t a r t  of each day. Mature f a i lu re  ra tes  were used t o  
make the prediction. 
The curve of Figure 11may well  represent an upper value on ava i lab i l i ty  
fo r  the ALS, but a t  t h i s  time we cannot say. We sha l l  f ind out, however, a s  
we are  now embarking on a program for  evaluating ava i lab i l i ty  i n  cooperation 
with one overseas operator. 
out well. 
And we f e e l  confident t ha t  the system w i l l  prove 
ALS Conclusions 
The progress with the L-1011 t o  date has shown tha t  cer t i fying and 
supporting the maintenance of a highly redundant automatic landing system 
can be accomplished i n  a scheduled manner much l i k e  any other f l i g h t  control 
system. 
s t r a t e  tha t  the redundancy and complexity w i l l  not detract  from the economic 
benefits  of system ut i l iza t ion .  
Further, it i s  expected tha t  future progress w i l l  serve t o  demon- 
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Table 1. - L-1011 Avionic Flight Control System Equipment List 
Stability Augmentation System (SAS) 
2 Yaw Computers 
3 Rate Gyros 
2 Aileron Position Sensors (dual) 
2 Rudder Position Sensors (dual) 
Autopilot/Flight Director System (APFDS) 
2 Pitch Computers 
2 Roll Computers 
2 Pilot's Control Wheels 
2 Mode Annunciators 
2 Warning Indicators 
1 
3 Normal Accelerometers 
3 Lateral Accelerometers 
Mode Select Panel (5 modules) 
Speed Control System (SCS) . 
1 Speed Control Computer 
1 Autothrottle Servo 
2 Longitudinal Accelerometers 
Flight Control Electronic System (FCES) 
1 FCES Computer 
1 Trim Augxentation Computer 
2 Angle of Attack Sensors 
2 Stick Shakers 
1 Surface Position and Pitch Trim Indicator 
2 Control Panels 
10 Surface Position Sensors 
7 8.8 
T a b l e  2.  - L-1011 Dutch R o l l  C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  With and Without Yaw SAS 
ZONEIGURATION 
: l imb  
: l i m b  
: l i m b  
:mise 
k u i s e  
:mise (MMo) 
Dive (%) 
Dive (%) 
k u i s e  (1.4 Vs 
2 r u i s e  
Descent 
lo ld ing  
{olding 
lpproach 
(1.3 vs) 
(1.3 vs) 
LANDING 
LANDING 
LANDING 
(DLC ON) 
LANDING 
(1.4 vs) 
PEED 
KEAS 
246 
-
356 
358 
310 
260 
3 52 
412 
258 
221 
216 
256 
160 
139 
133 
141 
133 
143 
246 
FLIGHT CONDITIONS (MID CG) 
I I 1 I 
MACH ALTITUDE WEIGHT 1 FLAPS GEAR 
NO. 1 KF'T 1 KLBS 1 DEG 
.45 10 4d-k I UP UP 
965 
.8 
.86 
*a6 
90 
95 
9 95 
74 
0435 
* 45 
.4 
.292 
-21 
.2 
.213 
.2 
.262 
10 308.5 UP UP 
400 UP ' UP i 
33 1 350 ' 
37.5 ~ 300 up I * UP 
20 
UP 1 UP 
I 
26.5 300 
21.5 
42 
38 
15 
10 
1 . 5  
10 
0 
0 
0 
0 
10 
308 -5 
' 308.5 
I 
UP ! UP 
UP UP 
UP UP 
UP 
UP 
UP 
UP 
DOWN 
DOWN 
DOWN 
DOWN 
DOWN 
DOWN 
UP 
UP 
UP 
UP 
UP 
DOWN 
DOWN 
DOWN 
DOWN 
DOWN 
I * 
I 
1 i 
I I 
DUTCH ROLL MIDE 
DAMPING RATIO AND 
5' - 
* 32 
72 
.45 
.43 
55 
* 53 
.41 
.22 
.33 
-49 
50 
929 
.26 
.24 
.21 
.26 
.21 
.18 .io ' .20 
,17; .11 .18 
.14' .05 1 .15 
t 
.11 .15 
.12 
* 13 
.08 
09 
* 09 
-06 
.10 
9 17 
.16 
.13 
.12 
.12 
.12 
.12 
.05 -12 
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Table 3. - SAS Reliabi l i ty  Summary 
No. Of No. Of Latest Point 
Units Units E s t  h a t  e 
I 
Latest MTBF Mature 
Estimate Unit 
@ 90% Confid. MIBF 
6,800 4,600 
6,300 
47 , 100 
23,500 
23 , 500 
1 23,500 
6,400 
222,000 
24 , 000 
206,000 
10,000 
167 , ooo 
* One gyro is shared by each SAS channel as i s  one e l ec t r i ca l  source. 
** 
f 
Any elements eomon t o  both SAS channels a re  negligible r e  MTBF estimates. 
There were no f a i lu re s  i n  reporting period. 
Table 4. - Estimated MI'BF's vs MTBF Lower L i m i t s  
MTBF Lower Latest lvITBF Mature MTBF 
It em L i m i t  Point E s t .  
* No reported fa i lures  i n  54,000 servo f l i g h t  hours. 
** No reported f a i lu re s  i n  81,000 accelerometer f l i g h t  hours. 
+++e+ No reported f a i lu re s  i n  27,000 f l i g h t  hours. 
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Table 5. - Automatic Landing Systein Major Elements 
Item 
7
Pitch Computer 
Roll Computer 
Yaw Computer 
Roll A/P Servo 
Pitch A/P Servo 
Yaw A/P Servo 
Aileron Position Sensor 
Rudder Position Sensor 
Yaw Rate Gyro 
Mode Annunciator 
Warning Indicator 
Mode Select Panel 
Normal Accelerometer 
Lateral Accelerometer 
Attitude Gyro 
Radio Altimeter 
ILS Receiver 
Speed Control Computer 
Autothrottle Servo 
Longitudinal Accelerometer 
FCES Computer 
DLC Servo 
Trim Augmentation Computer 
Angle of Attack Sensor 
Air Data Computer 
Altimeter 
IAS/M Indicator 
VSI 
AD1 
HSI 
Radio Altitude Indicator 
Compass System 
Hydrauli c Source 
Electric Source 
NO. 
Req . 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
2 
2 
1 
3 
3 
3 
2 
2 
1 
1 
2 
1 
2 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
Remarks 
Each computer is dual channel. 
Each servo is in-line monitored. 
Each sensor is dual. 
11 11 I1 11 
Each has limited in-line monitoring. 
Each has limited in-line monitoring 
Each has dual outputs with high 
integrity monitoring. 
Computer is dual channel 
Servo is in-line monitored 
Provides for fail-op/fail-pass DLC 
Each is in-line monitored 
Provides for fail-oplfail-pass 
Each has limited in-line 
Each has limited in-line 
auto pitch trim. 
monitoring. 
monitoring. 
791 
c
 
I
 
I- 
I
 
W
 
I
 
s? 
792 
7.93 
! 
I 
I 
w
 
-I 
3
 
n 0 I 
-I 
0
 
794 
795 
--- 
796 
a
 
w 
797 
c
 
M
 
c 0 
k
 
u
 
798 
VERTICAL TAIL SHEAR 
Figure 8 Frequency of Exceedance of Vert ical  T a i l  
Shear With and Without Yaw Damper 
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Figure 11Automatic Landing System Avai lab i l i ty  - Cat. IIIa 
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